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Abstract
This research examines how the board of commissioners’ structure 
and ownership retention affect IPO underpricing in Indonesia. 
In this study, we have examined the following three aspects: the 
number of board of commissioners, percentage of independent 
commissioners, and percentage of female commissioners. In 
total, 186 Indonesian companies that have conducted IPO 
from 2001 to 2016 were included in this study. This study 
uses multiple regressions to test the hypothesis. Our findings 
show that ownership retention has a negative implication on 
underpricing. Furthermore, the number of board of commissioners 
and independent commissioners has also been determined to 
reduce the level of underpricing. However, female commissioners 
were found to have no significant effect on IPO underpricing; 
furthermore, it demonstrated no significant effect in reducing the 
level of underpricing. These results show that higher ownership 
retention, a smaller number of board members, and a higher 
percentage of independent commissioners can reduce IPO 
underpricing.
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Initial public offering has been considered as an important event for any company, 
where they can change their status from private to being a public company by selling 
their shares or stocks to the general public. Usually, on the first day of trading, the 
offer price of the share and its market value do not match. If the market value is 
higher than the offer price, it is referred to as underpricing. On the contrary, if the 
market value is lower than the offer price, it is called overpricing. Most Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) events result in underpricing of shares. This phenomenon has already 
happened in most countries around the world (Banerjee et al., 2011; Hopp & Dreher, 
2013; Rathnayake et al., 2019). IPO underpricing can often range from 6.12% (in 
New Zealand) to 96% (in India) (Hopp & Dreher, 2013). India has been identified 
as the country with the highest IPO underpricing, followed by Malaysia with 87.12%. 
A study by Banerjee et al. (2011) shows that on average, IPO underpricing using 
cross-country study is approximately at 29.11%. In another study, Mehmood et al. 
(2020) showed that developing markets have higher IPO underpricing rates compared 
to developed ones. 
Allen & Faulhaber (1989) and Grinblatt & Hwang (1989) have both developed 
signaling theory in order to explain IPO underpricing. Signaling theory argues that every 
company knows their value. Therefore, most companies use IPO underpricing to signal 
their worth. Most investors believe that companies that are able to handle the cost of 
IPO underpricing are good prospects. Conversely, if the company might not have good 
prospect they will suffer to bear underpricing cost from the IPO event. Thus, most 
companies use IPO underpricing in convincing investors of their potential. 
The study on underpricing can be divided into the antecedents and the consequences 
of IPO underpricing. Some antecedents of IPO underpricing are as follows: financial 
condition of the firms (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013; Kotlar et al., 2018; Kurniawan, 
2014; Pahlevi, 2014) and corporate governance practice (Boulton et al., 2011; Hopp 
& Dreher, 2013) such as ownership structure (Bertoni et al., 2014; Handa & Singh, 
2017), board structure (Bertoni et al., 2014; Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013), and gender 
diversity (McGuinness, 2018; McGuinness et al., 2017). Meanwhile, the other aspect 
of this study is the consequences of IPO underpricing to market’s future performance, 
for example, taking into consideration the performance of the market in the short 
(Manjunath et al., 2020; Sahoo & Rajib, 2010; Tutuncu, 2020) and long run (Sahoo 
& Rajib, 2010; Thomadakis et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2015). 
Previous studies on IPO underpricing in Indonesia mostly conduct by Darmadi 
& Gunawan (2013), Gumanti & Alkaf (2011), Gumanti et al. (2017), and Pahlevi 
(2014). Previous studies provide evidence that there is a significant IPO underpricing 
in Indonesia, with a reported average of 22.35 % (Gumanti & Alkaf, 2011) and 23.7 
% (Bandi et al., 2020). Darmadi & Gunawan (2013) have also found that on average, 
underpricing in Indonesia is at 22.2 %, with the structure of the board serving as a 
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structure was determined to have no significant effect on IPO underpricing. Furthermore, 
Widarjo et al. (2017) and Widarjo & Bandi (2018) have highlighted the importance 
of intellectual capital disclosure in reducing information asymmetry and underpricing. 
On the other hand, Darmadi & Gunawan (2013) demonstrated that having 
independent commissioners has a positive effect on IPO underpricing. Instead, of reducing 
IPO’s underpricing level, the percentage of independent commissioners can increase the 
level of underpricing. This result shows that in this case, independent commissioners 
might have failed to effectively minimize the information asymmetry between companies 
and investors. This result is in line with the findings of Prabowo & Simpson (2011) 
who found that having independent commissioners has no significant effect on firm 
performance in Indonesia. This result was confirmed Handa & Singh (2017) and Arora 
& Singh (2020a) who determined that independent directors in India have no significant 
effect on underpricing. On the other hand, Bertoni et al. (2014) and Kubicek et al. 
(2017) support the hypothesis that independent directors have minimized the level of 
underpricing. Setiawan et al. (2019) showed that independent commissioners in Indonesia 
have mitigated earnings management. Thus, independent commissioners have positive 
effect on earnings quality in Indonesia.
Another aspect to examine is the size of the board of commissioners. There are 
two theories that need to be considered on this matter: (1) the smaller size is better as 
it could result in quick management responses and less communication problems (Bliss, 
2011). (2) Having more commissioners on board is better for more varied expertise. 
On a study by Bertoni et al. (2014), it was determined that having more members in 
the board of commissioners can negatively affect underpricing. This result shows that 
the smaller the number of commissioners, the better. This result shows that the size of 
committee can reduce the level of underpricing. However, Handa and Singh (2017) have 
found that the board size has a positive effect on IPO underpricing in India. Using a 
specific context of SME IPOs in India, Arora & Singh (2020a) also find that board 
size have positive effect. On the other hand, Darmadi & Gunawan (2013), Kubicek et 
al. (2017), and Xu et al. (2017) have determined that this factor has no effect on IPO 
underpricing in China. 
This current study also focuses on how having female commissioners affects IPO 
underpricing. A study by Dieleman & Aishwarya (2012) has showed that the number 
of female directors and commissioners in Indonesia is approximately at 11.6 %. This 
number is lower compared to other developed countries such as Europe (17 %) and 
Australia (13.8 %); however, Indonesia has much better percentage of women in the 
board compared to other emerging countries that only have 7.2 %. It is expected that 
this gender diversity will have a positive effect on the performance of the firm and thus 
a negative effect on the level of underpricing. However, previous studies have shown 
that female directors have no significant effect on IPO underpricing (Handa & Singh, 
2015; Kaur & Singh, 2015; McGuinness, 2018). In this specific context, female directors 
were determined to have no significant effect on the SMEs’ IPO in India (Arora & 
Singh, 2020b). Singh et al. (2019) have examined the impact of female directors on 




the performance of firms in the long run in India. Their findings showed that this has 
no significant effect in terms of improving the performance of a certain firm. This was 
in contrary to the findings of Kubicek et al. (2017), who claimed that female directors 
have a positive effect on IPO underpricing. Meanwhile, a study Badru et al. (2019) has 
highlighted the importance of the presence of female directors on IPO events. Female 
directors mitigate the information asymmetry during IPO events; thus, the presence of 
female directors indicates the quality of the IPO. 
This study also examines the effect of ownership retention on IPO underpricing. 
Albada et al. (2018) have looked into the indicators of IPO events in Malaysia and 
determined that ownership retention is one of the important aspects most investors 
consider. Therefore, investors use this signal to make investment decisions during IPO 
events in Malaysia. This result is in line with the argument made by Mehmood et al. 
(2020) that ownership retention is an essential factor to IPO underpricing. Furthermore, 
Albada et al. (2019) have examined 377 IPO events in Malaysia from 2000 to 2015, 
wherein it was determined that retention ratio negatively affects the first-day price range 
of IPO events. Most investors use retention ratio in evaluating the trading price of IPO 
events on the first day, thus highlighting the importance of ownership retention during 
IPO events.
Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti (2012) and Anand & Singh (2019) have also investigated 
the effect of controlling shares in order to retain ownership by using an emerging market 
sample such as Thailand and India. The result of this study shows that controlling 
ownership to retain the status of the previous owners as the majority ones has a positive 
effect on underpricing. However, Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti (2012) argue that controlling 
shares to retain ownership in a country with low investor protection can increase 
IPO underpricing. This result shows the importance of institutional context for IPO 
underpricing. Furthermore, this study shows that ownership retention positively affects 
IPO underpricing in most high-technology firms in Taiwan (Gao & Hou, 2019). On 
the other hand, Yang et al. (2020) have examined the effect of ownership retention on 
SMEs’ IPO in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2014 in China and have observed 
no significant effect. This result shows that ownership retention is of no relevance to 
the investors. 
Further, Kotlar et al. (2018) have found that ownership retention has a negative 
effect on IPO underpricing. This retention of ownership provides a positive signal to 
possible investors that owners still have more power on these companies; therefore, it 
will ensure minimal conflicts between owners. Further, Vismara (2016) claimed that 
ownership retention has a positive effect on the probability of success for IPO firms.
On this study, we focus on the antecedents of IPO underpricing in Indonesia. 
Previous studies have showed the effects the board of directors’ structure has on IPO 
underpricing (Kubicek et al., 2017). Unlike other countries, Indonesia uses a two-tier 
board system: board of directors and board of commissioners. The board of directors 
focuses on the day-to-day management and operation of the company, while the board 
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independent and non-independent members. Other countries such as the USA, the 
UK, and Australia use a one-tier board system. Therefore, it is interesting to examine 
how this two-tier board system in Indonesia affects its IPO underpricing. Further, this 
current study considers the importance of ownership retention in IPO underpricing. 
Ownership retention refers to the percentage of share the owner maintains and 
holds. Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti (2012) have demonstrated that ownership retention 
can reduce underpricing. Albada et al. (2018) have determined that retention ratio is 
the most important factor in attracting potential investors in terms of IPO activity in 
Malaysia. The result also shows the positive effect of ownership retention on the initial 
IPO return. Therefore, investor uses this signal to adjust the price of share during the 
first day of the trading (Albada et al., 2019). Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti (2012) have also 
argued that controlling retention ownership in the country with low investor protection 
has increased IPO underpricing. This result shows the importance of institutional context 
in terms of IPO underpricing. 
Previous study shows the importance of IPO events for investors. Mostly, there is 
an underpricing price during the IPO events (Banerjee, et al., 2011; Hopp & Dreher, 
2013; Rathnayake, et al., 2019). Therefore, it is important to investigate the determinant 
factors of IPO underpricing. Provide study provide inconsistent result of the effect of 
variable such as board of directors structure, female directors and ownership intention 
to the IPO underpricing. Thus, this study tries to fill this gap. This study examines the 
effect of board of commissioners’ structure, female commissioners and ownership retention 
to IPO underpricing. This study also uses unique characteristics of board structure in 
Indonesia. Indonesia uses two tier board system, there are board of commissioners and 
board od directors. It is interesting to test the effect of board of commissioners’ structure 
to the IPO underpricing in Indonesia.
Thus, this study focuses on how the following structures affect IPO underpricing: 
percentage of independent commissioners, the number of the board of commissioners, 
percentage of female commissioners, and ownership retention. The objectives of this 
study are as follows: First is to provide evidence on how the board of commissioners’ 
structure affects IPO underpricing. It is expected that the percentage of independent 
commissioners, the size of the board committee, and the number of female commissioners 
can minimize IPO underpricing. Second, this study provides evidence on the importance 
of ownership retention on IPO underpricing.
Methods 
In total, this study included 293 firms that conducted IPO events in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2016. However, we cannot find 75 prospectuses of the 
IPO firms and 32 of prospectus have incomplete data. Therefore, the final sample of 
this study consisted of 186 firms. This study has examined the effect of the board 
of commissioners’ structure and ownership retention on IPO underpricing. Dependent 
variable of this study is IPO underpricing. IPO underpricing refers to the difference 




between closing price in the first day of trading market and offer price divided by offer 
price (Handa & Singh, 2017). 
The independent variables of this study are as follows: percentage of independent 
commissioners, the number of commissioners, percentage of female commissioners, and 
ownership retention. The percentage of independent commissioners can be measured by 
the number of independent commissioners divided by the size of board of commissioners 
(Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013). The size of the board of commissioners refers to the 
number of its members (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013; Kubicek et al., 2017); the number 
of female commissioners is considered dummy variable 1 if there is female in the board 
and 0 if otherwise. Meanwhile, ownership retention is measured by the number of shares 
the previous owners have divided by the total number of issued shares (Kotlar et al., 
2018; Widarjo et al., 2017). This study uses the following four control variables: firm’s 
age, leverage, ROA, and audit firm. Firm’s age refers to the number of years from the 
founding year to the IPO year (Kotlar et al., 2018), leverage is debt to equity ratio 
(Setiawan et al., 2016), ROA is defined as the return on assets, and audit firm is 
dummy variable 1 if audit firm is a member of Big-4 and 0 if otherwise (Darmadi & 
Gunawan, 2013). 
Table 1. Variable Definition
Variable Definition
Dependent Variable
IPO underpricing the difference between closing price in the first day of trading market 
and offer price divided by offer price (Handa & Singh, 2017)
Independent  Variables:
Independent commissioners the number of independent commissioners divided by the size of board 
of commissioners (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013).
Size of board of commissioners the number of board of commissioners’ members (Darmadi & Gunawan, 
2013; Kubicek et al., 2017)
Female commissioners dummy, 1 if there is female in the board of commissioners and 0 if 
otherwise. 
Ownership retention the number of shares the previous owners have divided by the total 
number of issued shares (Kotlar et al., 2018; Widarjo et al., 2017)
Control Variables
Firm’s age the number of years from the founding year to the IPO year (Kotlar et 
al., 2018)
Leverage Debt to equity ratio (Setiawan, et al., 2016)
ROA Return on asset
Audit firm dummy variable 1 if audit firm is a member of Big-4 and 0 if otherwise 





Volume 20 (1), 2021: 185 - 200
The research model for the study is
UPit = α + β1OR + β2SBoCs + β3IC + β4FBoCs + β5FAge + β6Lev + β7ROA + β8Audit + ε
Where:
UPit = underpricing, difference between closing price in the first day of trading market 
and offer price divided by offer price
OR = ownership retention, the number of share the previous owners hold divided 
by the total number of issued shares
SBoCs = size of the board of commissioners refers to the number of its members
IC =  independent commissioners, the number of independent commissioners divided 
by the size of the board of commissioners
FBoCs =  female commissioner is dummy variable 1 if there is female in the board of 
commissioners and 0 if otherwise
FAge = Firm’s age is the number of year from the founding year to the IPO year
Lev = leverage, debt to equity ratio
ROA = Return on assets
Audit = audit firm is dummy variable 1 if audit firm is a member of Big-4 and 0 if 
otherwise
Results and Discussion 
Table 2 and Table 3 provide the statistics descriptive of the study. Table 2 shows 
that the mean value of underpricing in Indonesia is at 29.913 %. This number is higher 
compared to that in Darmadi & Gunawan (2013), Gumanti & Alkaf (2011), and Bandi 
et al. (2020) with 22.2 %, 22.35 %, and 23.7 %, respectively. However, this number 
is way less compared to the findings of Boulton et al. (2010) and Safitri (2013), which 
is at 42.3 % and 33.66 %, respectively.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation
Underpricing 186 0 188.571 29.913 29.144
Ownership retention 186 30.000 90.258 74.543 11.120
Size of BoCs 186 2 9 3.527 1.392
Independent commissioners 186 0 66.667 36.821 16.022203
Firm age 186 2 144 18.010 15.916
Leverage 186 0 84.596 3.030 6.816
ROA 186 −1.238 4.648 0.080 0.401
Furthermore, the retention ratio was determined to range from 30 % to 90 %, 
with a mean value of 74.53 %. This number shows that in Indonesia, majority of the 
shares are retained and held by its previous owners even after the IPO event. Table 1 




shows that the board of commissioners often has two to nine members (mean value, 
3.527). The mean value for independent commissioners in this sample was determined 
to be at 36.831 %. Thus, the average for independent commissioners in IPO firms in 
Indonesia is around 33.33 %. Table 3 shows that around 39.24 % of the board of 
commissioners is composed of women. Almost 4 out of 10 IPO firms in Indonesia 
have gender diversity.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variables
Frequency 0 Frequency 1
Female commissioners 0.608 0.393
Audit firm 0.720 0.280
Table 2 also provides information regarding control variables in this current study. 
Firms were determined to be on average 18 years old. Furthermore, the range of leverage 
is 0 % up to 84.596 %, with the average of 3.030 %. Table 3 also shows that most of 
the IPO firms in Indonesia use non-Big-4 as their audit firms. The percentage of IPO 
firms audited by Big-4 is at 28 %, while the rest is audited by non-Big-4. The average 
value for the ROA in this study is 8 %.
Underpricing, difference between closing price in the first day of trading market 
and offer price divided by offer price; ownership retention, the number of shares owned 
by previous owners divided by the total number of issued shares; size of BoCs = size 
of board of commissioners refers to the number of board members; IC = independent 
commissioners, number of independent commissioners divided by the total number 
of commissioners; female BoCs = female commissioner is dummy variable 1 if there 
is female in the board of commissioners and 0 if otherwise; firm age, number of 
years from the founding year to the IPO year; leverage, debt to equity ratio; ROA 
= return on assets; audit firm, dummy variable 1 if audit firm is member of Big-4 
and 0 if otherwise
Table 4 provides the result of the correlation between variables. Significant 
correlations were determined between independent variables: ownership retention, 
size of the board of commissioners, percentage of independent commissioners, and 
underpricing. However, female commissioners have no significant correlation with 
underpricing. This result also shows that ownership retention has significant effects 
on IPO underpricing. Further, both the number of members and the presence of 
independent commissioners were determined to have a significant effect on IPO 
underpricing. Audit firm was also determined to have a significant correlation with 
underpricing. It might seem that audit firms have significant effect on IPO underpricing. 
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0.072 −0.078 0.052 −0.006
(0.330) (0.288) (0482) (0.931)
Firm age
−0.105 0.051 0.095 0.019 0.001
(0.155) (0.487) (0.199) (0.795) (0.997)
Leverage
−0.068 0.021 0.144b 0.182b −0.102 0.031
(0.358) (0.774) (0.050) (0.013) (0.165) (0.676)
ROA
0.075 −0.090 0.001 −0.069 −0.068 0.004 −0.056
(0.309) (0.224) (0.991) (0.352) (0.356) (0.961) (0.449)
Audit firm
−0.236a 0.174b 0.178b −0.001 −0.206a 0.156b 0.135 −0.042
(0.001) (0.018) (0.015) (0.989) (0.005) (0.033) (0.066) (0.566)
a,b,c significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 %. Number in the bracket is the probability.
Table 5 shows that the size of the board of commissioners has a negative 
effect on underpricing. This result confirms the theory that having a fewer number 
of members is better (Bliss, 2011) as it allows better decision-making and minimizes 
information asymmetry between companies and its investors. Its other advantages are 
as follows: able to make decisions quickly, less communication problems, and lesser 
free riders among the member of the board of commissioners. Thus, having fewer 
board members can effectively reduce the level of IPO underpricing. This result 
is confirmed by previous studies such as of Bertoni et al. (2014) who found that 
larger board size negatively affects IPO underpricing like in Germany, France, and 
Italy. However, this was contrary to the previous studies of Darmadi & Gunawan 
(2013), Hearn (2011, 2012), Kaur & Singh (2015), and Kubicek et al. (2017) who 
claimed that board size has a significant effect on IPO underpricing. Therefore, this 
study argues that the number of board members can significantly minimize IPO 
underpricing. The larger size of the board of commissioners has minimized the 
IPO underpricing in Indonesia. This result shows that the larger size of board of 
commissioners provide positive impact on the firm outcome.
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Table 5 also shows that when there are more independent commissioners, the IPO 
underpricing will be negatively affected, thus minimizing the IPO underpricing. This result 
confirms the assumption that the percentage of independent commissioners negatively 
affects the IPO underpricing: the higher the percentage of independent commissioners, 
the lower will be the IPO underpricing. This result is in line with Setiawan et al. 
(2019) who found that independent commissioners in Indonesia might have effectively 
mitigated earnings management. Independent commissioners in Indonesia engage in 
effective corporate governance in an effort to reduce information asymmetry between 
firms and its investor during the IPO process. The result of this study is consistent 
with the findings of Bertoni et al. (2014) and Kubicek et al. (2017) who claimed 
that independent directors were able to minimize the level of underpricing. Thus, this 
further shows the importance of independent commissioners during the IPO process. 
Independent commissioners provide effective monitoring to the IPO process in Indonesia. 
This result shows that independent commissioners have important effect on corporate 
governance mechanism. In a study by Neupane & Neupane (2017), they highlighted the 
importance of board independence in attracting more foreign investors to the company. 
Board independence is a signal to the investors that the company is better in terms of 
business performance. However, our findings might not agree with the previous studies 
conducted by Darmadi & Gunawan (2013), Handa & Singh (2017), and Arora & 
Singh (2020a) who found that independent commissioners do not significantly reduce 
the level of IPO underpricing.
Meanwhile, this current study also claims that having female commissioners does not 
have a significant effect on IPO underpricing. This result does not confirm the assumption 
that female commissioners have a negative effect on IPO underpricing. Therefore, our 
findings confirm the previous studies of Handa & Singh (2015), Kaur & Singh (2015), 
McGuinness (2016), and Arora & Singh (2020b) that claimed that female directors have 
no significant effect on IPO underpricing. Therefore, female commissioners are determined 
to have no significant effect on the process of IPO in Indonesia. The gender diversity 
might not effectively minimize the level of IPO underpricing. One of the arguments 
from Handa & Singh (2015) is that the number of female commissioners is too small. 
Therefore, female commissioners might not effectively engage in supervisory function. 
There is no significant different between male and female commissioners during IPO 
events. The study of Reutzel & Belsito (2015) has also determined that the market reacts 
negatively to the female directors during the IPO process. However, these results do not 
confirm the previous studies conducted by Kubicek et al. (2017) and Badru et al. (2019) 
who both claimed that having female directors reduce the level of IPO underpricing.
Table 5 further shows the effect of ownership retention on IPO underpricing. Our 
findings demonstrate that ownership retention has a negative effect on IPO underpricing. 
This result shows that the decision of the previous owner to retain their shares is an 
indicator to potential investors that previous owners still have significant control of the 
company. This will decrease the agency cost between previous owners and incoming 
owners. This is consistent with the findings of Kotlar et al. (2018) who indicated that 




ownership retention has a negative effect on IPO underpricing. The higher percentage 
of ownership retention has lowered the underpricing during IPO events. Ownership 
retention can be considered as a positive signal to potential investors as the probability 
of the company to become successful is higher (Vismara, 2016). Investors often use this 
piece of information to evaluate the share price in the first day of IPO events; therefore, 
ownership retention has a positive effect on the initial return for an IPO on the first 
day. Ownership retention is deemed an important signal to potential investors in terms 
of the quality of the IPO (Albada et al., 2019; Albada et al., 2018). van der Goot et al. 
(2009) also provide evidence that Internet firms that survive after the IPO have higher 
ownership retention compared to the non-survivors. However, this study disagrees with 
the findings of Ekkayokkaya & Pengniti (2012), Anand & Singh (2019) and Yang et 
al. (2020) who found that ownership retention has a positive effect on underpricing. 
Table 5 also shows the effects of the following control variables on IPO underpricing: 
firm age, leverage, ROA, and audit firms, wherein these factors were determined to have 
no significant effects on IPO underpricing. Therefore, most investors might not consider 
firm age, leverage, and ROA on their decisions during the IPO process. However, audit 
firms can negatively affect IPO underpricing. Our results show that Big-4 audit and 
non-Big-4 audit firms can affect IPO underpricing differently. Big-4 audit firms can 
lower the level of IPO underpricing compared to non-Big-4 firms. Thus, Big-4 audit 
firms can reportedly reduce the level of IPO underpricing.
Conclusions
This study has examined the effect of board of commissioners’ structure and ownership 
retention on IPO underpricing. Our findings show that having smaller board size can 
mitigate IPO underpricing, further reducing its level. With its smaller size, the board of 
commissioners will be able to respond better because of less communication problems 
and less free riders. Having independent commissioners can also have positive effects as 
it they can supervise the management. The percentage of independent commissioners has 
been determined to have a negatively effect on the level of IPO underpricing. Therefore, 
this study confirms the assumption that independent commissioners are important in 
corporate governance systems. As they reduce the level of underpricing during IPO 
process. Further, this study also shows that ownership retention has a negative effect on 
IPO underpricing. The higher percentage of shares retained by the previous owners can 
reduce the level of IPO underpricing. However, this study failed to find any significant 
effects of having female commissioners in terms of IPO underpricing. 
This current study has used a dummy variable to measure for gender diversity in 
the board of commissioners. This is one of the limitations of this research. Therefore, 
future studies might want to explore the detailed effects of female characteristics, such as 
age, education background, and tenure, on IPO underpricing in order to have a more 
comprehensive insight on how gender diversity affects IPO process (Badru et al., 2019). 
Our study has focused in Indonesia; thus, future studies might want to examine these 
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The implications of this study are as follows: first, it is suggested that companies 
keep the members of the board of commissioners in small number as it will translate 
to better performance and further minimize the level of IPO underpricing. Second, it 
is suggested that companies increase their percentage of independent commissioners as 
it has been determined to be effective in reducing the level of IPO underpricing. Third, 
ownership retention has been identified to have a positive effect in attracting potential 
investors; thus, it is important to consider the level of ownership retention to minimize 
IPO underpricing.
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